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 Abstract 
The biological basis of the commonality in color lexicons across languages has been hotly 
debated for decades. Prior evidence that infants categorize color could provide support for the 
hypothesis that color categorization systems are not purely constructed by communication and 
culture. Here, we investigate the relationship between infants’ categorization of color and the 
commonality across color lexicons, and investigate the potential biological origin of infant 
color categories. We systematically mapped infants’ categorical recognition memory for hue 
onto a stimulus array used previously to document the color lexicons of 110 non-industrialized 
languages. Following familiarization to a given hue, infants’ response to a novel hue indicated 
that their recognition memory parses the hue continuum into red, yellow, green, blue and purple 
categories. Infants’ categorical distinctions aligned with common distinctions in color lexicons, 
and are organized around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories across 
languages. The boundaries between infants’ categorical distinctions also aligned, relative to the 
adaptation point, with the cardinal axes that describe the early stages of color representation in 
retinogeniculate pathways, indicating that infant color categorization may be partly organized 
by biological mechanisms of color vision. The findings suggest that color categorization in 
language and thought is partially biologically constrained, and have implications for broader 
debate on how biology, culture and communication interact in human cognition. 
 
Significance Statement 
Humans parse the continuum of color into discrete categories (e.g., ‘red’ and ‘blue’), and the 
origin of these categories has been debated for many decades. Here we provide evidence that 
infants have color categories for red, yellow, green, blue and purple. We show that infants’ 
categorical distinctions align strikingly with those that are commonly made in the world’s 
different color lexicons. We also find that infants’ categorical distinctions relate to the activities 
of the two neural sub-systems responsible for the early stages of color representation. These 
findings suggest that color categorization is partly organized and constrained by the biological 
mechanisms of color vision, and is not arbitrarily constructed by language.  
 
 
 
 
 
Main Text  
The extent to which cognition is biologically ‘hardwired’ has been hotly debated (1–4). Color 
cognition has provided a fertile testing ground for such debate. One key question has been the 
origin of color terms and their categories. Although the spectrum of color is continuous, 
humans typically refer to colors with a number of discrete terms (e.g., red, green, blue). Some 
have argued that how terms categorize the continuum of color and how color lexicons evolve 
is biologically constrained (5, 6), others have argued that color terms and their categories are 
culturally and linguistically constructed (7). Cognitive scientists from a broad range of 
disciplines (e.g., linguistics, neuroscience, vision science, anthropology, developmental 
science) have been working for decades to understand how color terms and their categories 
form. These efforts have established that although the color lexicons of the world’s languages 
vary in the number of color terms and in how they parse the continuum of color, there is also 
striking commonality across languages and evidence for ‘universal’ constraints (8–12). For 
example, in the World Color Survey (WCS), speakers of 110 non-industrialized languages 
named 320 colors (13), and analyses have shown that the centers of the categories denoted by 
these languages’ color terms cluster around particular hues (8). These particular hue regions 
also appear to be central to the color categories of industrialized languages (e.g., English), and 
are commonly the location of the ‘focal’ best examples of color terms (10).  The organizing 
principles for this common categorization structure have been sought, and computational 
models have suggested a number of sources such as the chromatic structure of natural scene 
statistics (14) chromatic discrimination thresholds (15) or ‘near-optimal partitioning’ 
mechanisms based on basic principles of categorization (9). There has also been a hunt for 
neurons which encode color categorically in regions of the visual cortex and early ventral 
stream (16–18).  
Although we do not yet have solid evidence for the neural basis of commonalities and 
‘universal’ constraints in color naming, further impetus for the idea that color terms and 
categories have a biological basis has come from studies with infants (19–27). Converging 
evidence suggests that pre-linguistic infants as young as four-months old respond categorically 
to color. Many of the infant studies have relied on the ‘novelty preference’ method that has 
been used to demonstrate that categorization is a domain-general and fundamental aspect of 
infant cognition (28). Infants are familiarized to a given hue through repeated presentation 
(until infant looking at the hue wanes) and a novel hue is then presented during a test phase. If 
infants look longer at a novel than familiar hue at test (a novelty preference) then infants are 
deemed to distinguish the two hues in their recognition memory. Studies have shown that infant 
recognition memory appears to distinguish hues that are differentiated by certain lexical 
distinctions (e.g., blue-green), and infant recognition memory treats hues within these lexical 
categories as if they are equivalent (e.g., no novelty preference). This ‘same-category’ 
equivalence in recognition memory has been found even when hues within a lexical category 
are well above infants’ chromatic discrimination thresholds when measured with simple 
detection tasks (24, 25), and when hue differences are maximized (24). Infants’ responses 
therefore fit the classic definition of categorization: ‘responding in an equivalent manner to 
discriminably different stimuli’ (29, pg 52). Evidence for a categorical response in infant 
recognition memory for hue has also been provided using neuroimaging methods, such as event 
related potentials (22), and near infra-red spectroscopy (27).  
Infants’ apparent categorization of color suggests that color categorization may have a 
biological origin.  Of course, lexical color categories cannot be completely biologically 
determined since color lexicons vary across languages both in the number of color terms and 
in the location of lexical color boundaries. Communication needs, and cultural and 
environmental forces are inevitably valuable in explaining the evolution of a color lexicon 
within a culture (29). However, it is possible that lexical color categories are partly rooted in 
the underlying mechanisms of the early visual system that code for color. This partial constraint 
could potentially explain the commonality in categorization structure across the world’s 
languages, such as the clustering of categories around particular regions of color (8) or the 
common category ‘motifs’ that are seen across languages (10).  
Although it is theoretically possible that color categories have biological roots, the current 
evidence of a categorical response to color in infancy is insufficient for a full endorsement of 
this theory. First, the majority of the evidence for a categorical response to color in infants 
comes from testing a few color categories that are defined by their lexical distinction in English 
(e.g., blue-green and blue-purple). The full continuum of hue has not been tested and so 
categorical distinctions may have been missed. This means that, although there is converging 
evidence that infants respond categorically to color, the number and location of infant color 
category boundaries is not currently known.  
A more complete characterization of infant color categorization is needed to clarify the 
relationship between infants’ categorical response and lexical color categories. One possibility 
is that the way in which infant categories divide up the hue continuum is highly similar to the 
structure of color lexicons. An alternative possibility is that infants’ categorical response is a 
quirk of a few limited regions of color space, and that it has little resemblance to more 
comprehensive categorization systems seen in language.  Infant color categories could align 
with those of specific languages, for example, lexicons of industrialized languages that have a 
greater number of basic terms than lexicons of non-industrialized languages. However, we 
consider it more likely that infant color categories would align not with any one language in 
particular, but rather with the categorization structure that is common across the world’s 
languages, since it is this commonality that potentially suggests some form of biological 
constraint. For example, one hypothesis is that infant color categories are organized around the 
hues that Kay and Regier (8) have revealed to be commonly at the centers of the categories of 
the WCS.  
A second reason why there is currently insufficient evidence for the theory that color 
categorization has biological origins is that the underlying mechanisms of infant color 
categorization have not been systematically investigated. Infant categories, at least at 4-months, 
are unlikely to have communication or cultural origins, but they are not necessarily rooted in 
the biological mechanisms of the visual system. It is often assumed that the presence of infant 
categorization is evidence of a biologically determined ‘innateness’, yet infants also have a 
remarkable ability to learn categories by tuning into the statistical regularities present in 
stimulus exemplars (30). Environmental origins of color categories have been proposed (e.g. 
(13)  and it is at least theoretically possible that infants are able to tune into the statistical 
regularities and structure of their chromatic environment in order to extract a categorization 
structure (22). Another possibility is that infants’ color categorization is based on ‘near-
optimal’ partitioning of the color spectrum as has been argued for lexical categorization (9), 
with infants also applying basic principles of categorization (31) to an uneven perceptual color 
space.    
When Berlin and Kay (5)  first discovered the regularity in the evolution of color terms across 
color lexicons, it was proposed that color categories had a biological basis. However, 
subsequent investigation of the retinogeniculate cone-opponent pathways of the visual system 
that underpin the early encoding of color has revealed that these pathways do not encode the 
‘basic’ white, black, red, green, blue and yellow categories (and the perceptually pure ‘unique’ 
hues of these categories) as originally proposed (32). What are commonly known as the ‘red-
green’ and ‘blue-yellow’ cardinal cone-opponent mechanisms are actually better described as 
‘cherry-teal’ and ‘chartreuse-violet’ in terms of the appearance of the colors they encode. The 
idea that the cardinal mechanisms can explain the commonality in color categorization across 
languages such as good examples (focals) and perceptually pure examples (unique hues) of 
color has therefore been largely dismissed. Nevertheless, there has been some recent tentative 
evidence for a link between the early color mechanisms and color categorization from a study 
that concluded that the ‘red-green’ cone-opponent mechanism accounted for the common 
‘warm-cool’ category distinction that arises from analysis of WCS naming data (33). It is 
theoretically possible that infants are able to draw on cone-opponent mechanisms in a similar 
way in order to categorize colors. Evidence that infant color categorization is related to the 
cardinal axes of color vision would be strong support for the theory that color categorization 
has biological origins.  
The current investigation had three aims:  First, to establish the hue categories that infants have; 
Second, to establish the relationship between infant color categories and adult color lexicons; 
Third, to identify the underlying mechanisms of infant color categorization and whether infant 
categories are related to the cardinal cone-opponent mechanisms that underlie early coding of 
color. Together, the findings aim to shed light on whether color categorization has biological 
origins that partially constrain the formation of color categories within a language.  
In order to address these aims, we mapped infant categories onto the hue circle using the 
stimulus array from the WCS. We systematically sampled colors from a row of the WCS 
stimulus grid. Within this row, hues span the hue circle, are at constant lightness and at varying 
chroma (similar to saturation or colorfulness). We sampled colors at regular hue intervals that 
we predicted, on the basis of infant chromatic thresholds  would be large enough to be 
discriminated at 4-6 months (34). We confirmed in an additional experiment that the colors are 
discriminable at 4-6 months and that the findings of the current experiment are not related 
simply to the perceptual similarity of the colors (see Fig S1). In the current experiment, we 
used the novelty preference method to look for hue pairs that are distinguished in infant 
recognition memory, and for hue pairs for which there is no novelty preference despite being 
discriminable in other contexts. As a second test, we also tested three larger hue pairs which 
straddled two or more smaller hue pairs to confirm whether or not hues in that region were 
distinguished in infant recognition memory when chromatic differences were larger. Regions 
where infants appear to treat hues as if equivalent are identified as being from one hue category, 
and regions where infants distinguish hues are identified as being categorically distinct. 
Systematically mapping infants’ hue distinctions, rather than just testing a few ‘English’ 
categories as in previous research, avoids a-priori assumptions that infant color categories align 
with lexical categories from any one language. Using the WCS stimulus grid allows direct 
comparison between the hues distinguished in infant recognition memory and the lexical 
distinctions and commonalities present in the world’s color lexicons, enabling the relationship 
between infant and lexical color categories to be clarified. For example, infant color 
categorization is compared to color lexicons from the WCS, to identify any correspondence 
between the categorical distinctions infants make and those in specific languages. In addition, 
we conducted an analysis across all 110 languages in the WCS to see whether infant color 
categories are structured to capture hues that are commonly central to lexical categories.  We 
then investigated the underlying mechanisms of infant categorization, and plotted the stimuli 
and infants’ responses in a color space which has axes that correspond to the cardinal 
mechanisms of color vision and represent activation along the retinogeniculate pathways.  
Results 
Novelty preference and infant color categories. Analysis of infant looking times during the 
familiarization phase confirmed that infants familiarized to each hue (see SI Familiarization 
and Novelty Preference). Novelty preference scores were calculated as: (time looked at novel 
color during test phase / total time looked at novel + familiar color during test phase)*100 (see 
SI figure 2, and SI Table 1 for raw data).  Novelty preferences are tested using Bayesian 
analysis (35–38). Bayes factors are reported which calculate the ratio of how probable the data 
is given one model (e.g., the null) relative to a second model (e.g., the alternative). A B of 3 or 
greater indicates substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis (H1) over the null (H0), 
often equivalent to p<.05 (36). A B of 0.33 or below indicates substantial evidence for H0 over 
H1 and a B between 3 and 0.33 indicates data insensitivity for distinguishing between either 
hypothesis. Bayesian analysis is more appropriate for our data than null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) as: i) we require our analysis to enable us to make statements on whether the 
null hypothesis can be accepted (whether infants treat colors equivalently), whereas NHST 
provides no measure of credibility in favor of the null and non-significant results do not enable 
a definite conclusion (39); ii) we needed a statistical approach which guarantees sensitivity 
with a minimum number of participants (we have a between subjects design with 16 conditions) 
and Bayes combined with an optional stopping rule (test until B is sensitive in either direction) 
enables this as B retains its exact meaning as the evidence in favor of H1 over H0 with further 
data collection (40); and iii) Bayes factors should not be adjusted for multiple testing (we have 
16 tests) as false alarm rates are dealt with through information in the data with no reference to 
how many other tests are conducted (41). In addition to Bayes factors, we report associated p-
values from null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST), although these are for reference only 
since they are affected by the optional stopping rule and multiple testing. We interpret all 
effects with respect to Bayes factors only.   
Stimuli were drawn from row G of the WCS Munsell array (Munsell Value = 4, Y= 12 cd/m2) 
in steps of 3 Munsell hues insofar as possible, yielding 14 stimulus hues. The Munsell 
coordinates of the stimulus hues, preceded by the column number in Figure 1, are (2, 5R), (3, 
7.5R), (6, 5YR), (9, 2.5Y), (12, 10Y), (15, 7.5GY), (18, 5G), (21, 2.5BG), (24, 10BG), (27, 
7.5B), (30, 5BP), (33, 2.5P), (36, 10P), and (39, 7.5 RP). Starting from column number 3, 
adjacent sampled hues were paired (e.g., 3&6, 6&9, 9&12……39&2) and novelty preferences 
for each pair were recorded (see Methods).  One-sample t-tests were conducted (against 50%) 
on novelty preference scores for each pair. Here, B refers to a Bayes factor in which the 
predictions of H1 were modeled as a normal distribution with an SD of 20.  All pairs had a 
sensitive B with 10 participants, apart from three pairs (7.5R-5YR, 7.5GY-5G and 5PB-2.5P) 
which required 17, 20, and 12 participants respectively. Bayes factors revealed support for H1 
for four hue pairs: green-yellow (7.5GY-10Y, t(9)=4.19, p=.002, B=686.05; blue-purple (5PB-
2.5P), t(11)=2.98, p=.001, B=7.43; blue-green (2.5BG-10BG), t(9)=2.81, p=.02, B=5.05; red-
yellow (7.5R-5YR), t(16)=2.67, p=.02, B=3.51; and purple-red (10P-7.5RP), t(9)=7.31, 
p=.001, B= 4.9E+09 (columns 3-6; 12-15; 30-33; 21-24 and 36-39 in figure 1A). The other 9 
pairs showed firm support for H0 (all B<1/3, weakest probability of H0 was for pair 7.5GY-
5G, where t=1.88, p =.07, B=0.19).  Infants were also tested on three more widely separated 
stimulus pairs which spanned several of the original pairs (three larger pairs within green, blue, 
red/yellow). There was firm support for H1 for the large red/yellow pair (7.5RP-10Y, columns 
38-12), t (9) =2.84, p=.02, B=6.30E+00 and for H0 for the larger hue differences within green 
(7.5GY-2.5BG, columns 24-30) or blue (10BG-5PB, columns 15-21), (largest t=1.34, smallest 
p=0.21, largest B=0.17).  We identify stimulus 10Y, 2.5Y and 7.5GY as ‘yellow’ here due to 
Munsell hue notation, although at the munsell value sampled, these hues are darker than 
prototypical yellow.  This issue is returned to in the Discussion. 
 
Fig 1. Infant color categorization and the relationship to lexical color categorization. (A) 
Novelty preferences suggest infant recognition memory distinguishes red-yellow, green-
yellow, blue-green and blue-purple hues but not hues within these categories. Sampled stimuli 
are outlined in black, horizontal lines joining stimuli indicate color pairs which did not elicit 
novelty preference, gaps indicate novelty preference. Numbers are from the WCS stimulus grid 
and indicate the different hues. (B) Color naming systems for row G stimuli based on: WCS 
data for Wobé (3 Basic Color Terms (BCTs)), Jicaque (5 BCTs) and Huave (7 BCTs); English 
color naming (11 BCTs, (42); and the ‘Green-Blue-Purple’ naming motif for row G stimuli 
(12). Vertical thick black lines indicate category boundaries between stimuli given the same 
most frequent term within a language. Correspondence between the category boundaries in 
language and infant novelty preferences can be seen. (C)  Frequency of category centroids from 
the WCS for each hue in row G (8). The gaps in the thick black horizontal bars at the bottom 
of figure 1C indicate hues which were straddled by color pairs which elicited novelty 
preference, as also shown by the gaps in the black horizontal lines in figure 1A. Category 
centroid frequencies tend to peak in regions which are not distinguished by infant recognition 
memory and are generally lowest in regions which are distinguished. 
 
Relationship to lexical color categories. Figure 1B gives examples of color naming systems 
for the sampled stimulus row for a selection of languages from the WCS which illustrate 
agreement between infants’ response and adult lexical colour categories (Wobé, Ivory Coast; 
Jicaque, Honduras & Huave, Mexico) with 3, 5 and 7 basic color terms (BCTs) respectively 
(9). Figure 1B also gives English naming data from (42) and the green-blue-purple naming 
motif (GBPm) that was identified from Lindsey and Brown’s (12) cluster analysis of WCS 
naming data, for row G stimuli. Correspondence between the distinctions made in infant color 
memory and those made by color terms and the color-naming motif can be seen by comparing 
figure 1A and 1B. The 5 categorical distinctions that infants make align with the location of 4 
of the distinctions made in the English color lexicon, and with lexical distinctions in color 
lexicons with fewer basic terms than English. For example, Huave is a color lexicon with 7 
basic color terms and 4/5 of the categorical distinctions in Huave for row G stimuli are in the 
same hue region as the distinctions that infants make in their recognition memory. We show 
correspondence between infant and lexical color categories for a selection of 3 WCS languages, 
yet inspection of naming data from the other WCS languages reveals correspondences for many 
other languages as well. We also find that infants’ categorical distinctions align with 3 of the 
categorical distinctions in the GBPm (12).  
Figure 1C plots the frequency of category centroids in WCS languages for all hues in row G of 
the WCS stimulus grid (8). The plot shows that the centers of the categories of 110 non-
industrialized color lexicons peak at particular hues and have minima at particular hues (low 
centroid counts are likely to indicate category boundaries). Infant novelty preferences are 
indicated underneath the plot by gaps in the solid black horizontal bars. The gaps align 
qualitatively well with the low points in the bar plot, corresponding to few WCS centroids. 
Distinctions infants make between green-yellow, blue-purple, purple-red, and red-yellow hues 
appear to provide fault lines that separate the centroid peaks from each other (Fig SI 3). Infants’ 
distinction between blue-green hues does not fit so well with this pattern, since although it 
separates the centroid peaks at blue and green, it also spans a region of high centroid counts 
from WCS languages which have composite blue-green ‘grue’ terms. Analysis of the number 
of category centroids for hues that were straddled by each pair, identified that the particular 
combination of 5 pairs for which infants had novelty preference spanned hues with fewer 
centroids than 4.27% of any other combination of 5 pairs from the pairs tested (SI Analysis of 
WCS Centroids).  This suggests that hue pairs which are categorically different for infants are 
in regions which are infrequently at the center of lexical categories and that infant color 
categories are optimally organized around hues which are commonly central to lexical color 
categories: fewer than 5% of other 5 pair combinations are better organized. 
Underlying mechanisms of infants’ response.  To test the hypothesis that infant color 
categorization is related to the cardinal mechanisms of color vision we plotted, using 
reflectance spectra taken from the University of Joensuu Color Group database 
(https://www.uef.fi/en/web/spectral/-spectral-database), the Stockman and Sharpe 2° cone 
fundamentals (43) and a D65 illuminant, the stimuli and infants’ novelty response in the 
MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity diagram (44). In this color diagram the axes L/(L+M) and 
S/(L+M) represent the ‘cardinal’ mechanisms of color vision that correspond to the two main 
retinogeniculate color pathways. The results are shown in Figure 2.  
 Fig 2. Stimuli plotted in MacLeod-Boynton cone-opponent space with (L/(L+M) and (S/L+M) 
cardinal axes of color vision that correspond to the retinogeniculate pathways. The dashed 
vertical and horizontal lines indicate the background (Munsell N5) to which infants were 
adapted. The Munsell hue codes for stimuli are given and black lines connecting stimuli 
indicate no novelty preference for that pair. The cross between 7.5R and 5R indicates a pair 
that was not tested.  
 
A regression analysis found that the Euclidean distances in MacLeod-Boynton color space did 
not predict infants’ novelty preferences (R2 =.01, p=.71, B=2.71E-17, see also an equivalent 
analysis in CIELAB color space in SI Discrimination and Novelty Preference, and Fig SI 4). 
Inspection of the stimuli and novelty preferences plotted in the MacLeod-Boynton chromaticity 
diagram suggests a relationship with the cardinal color mechanisms. Four of the pairs for which 
there were novelty preferences straddle the vertical and horizontal axes originating from the 
background chromaticity, Munsell N5, on which our stimuli were presented. This indicates a 
novelty preference in infants when stimulus pairs are at different polarities (relative to the 
background) either in S/(L+M) or in L/(L+M). Further analyses ruled out the hypothesis that 
variation in novelty preference across the pairs was driven by a-priori preferences (see SI). 
Discussion 
Converging evidence from prior research suggests that infants respond categorically to color. 
However, since the full hue circle has not been previously tested, the number and location of 
categorical hue distinctions were unknown. Therefore, the relationship between infant color 
categories and those of the world’s color lexicons, and the underlying mechanism of infant 
color categories have been unclear. In order to address these issues, we systematically mapped 
infants’ novelty preference responses onto a row of the WCS stimulus grid. Infants successfully 
familiarized to a given hue, and when presented subsequently with a novel hue, infants had a 
novelty preference for five pairs of hues in red-yellow, green-yellow, blue-green, blue-purple 
and purple-red regions of color space. There was also firm evidence for a lack of novelty 
response within the hue regions of blue, green, purple, yellow and red. The lack of a novelty 
response within purple, blue and green regions was found even when the largest hue differences 
spanning pairs that lacked a novelty response were tested.  
As noted earlier, we use the term ‘yellow’ to denote stimuli in the yellowish region of the hue 
continuum following the Munsell hue notation.  However, stimuli were sampled at constant 
lightness close to the lightness of the prototypes of other hues but darker than prototypical 
yellow.  The dark and non-prototypical nature of the stimuli in the yellow region may account 
for why there was much more individual variation for the less widely separated red-yellow and 
green-yellow pairs than most other pairs (more infants had to be tested on these pairs for a 
sensitive Bayes factor), and the novelty preference effect was weakest for the red-yellow pair. 
Testing these hues at prototypical lightness levels would confirm this. Nevertheless, whatever 
the appropriate gloss for the yellowish hues (and this would obviously vary across languages), 
the current study identifies a categorical distinction for infants in this region.   
An additional experiment and further analysis ruled out the hypothesis that novelty preferences 
were simply related to perceptual similarity and confirmed that colors can be discriminated in 
other contexts (see SI Discrimination and Novelty Preference). The findings therefore suggest 
that infants’ recognition memory is categorical: some colors are treated as if they are equivalent 
in infants’ recognition memory, yet others which are not always more perceptually dissimilar 
are treated as if they are different. Overall, our findings suggest that infant memory parses the 
hue continuum at the lightness level tested into five categories: red, yellow, green, blue and 
purple. Prior research has provided evidence that infants’ recognition memory parses color into 
blue, green (19, 20, 22, 23) and purple (23) categories, with a suggestion of separate red and 
yellow categories as well (19). Unlike prior studies, we systematically sampled at regular 
intervals around the complete hue circle, providing the first evidence that infant memory also 
distinguishes purple and red.  
Relationship to lexical color categories. Mapping infant categories onto the WCS stimulus grid 
clarifies the relationship between infant color categories and lexical color categorization. 
Correspondences between the location of infants’ categorical distinctions and those in color 
lexicons can be seen. In particular, the common green-blue-purple naming motif that was 
revealed by Lindsey and Brown’s (12) cluster analysis of WCS data has categorical distinctions 
in four of the same hue regions as those of infants. This correspondence between the 
distinctions that infants make and those in color naming systems is also highlighted by our 
comparison of infant color categories and the locations of the WCS category centroids from 
Kay and Regier (8). Infants have separate red, yellow, green, blue and purple categories, and 
there are also separate clusters of category centroids from WCS languages in these hue regions. 
Infants’ categorical distinctions isolate the peaks in category centroids from one another. An 
analysis revealed that hues at infant color category boundaries are not commonly at the center 
of lexical color categories. This suggests that hues within infant color categories (hues 
straddled by pairs where we find no novelty preference) are commonly at the center of lexical 
color categories. Infants’ blue-green categorical distinction did not fit the pattern so well, since 
it fell in a region where there are a high number of lexical category centers due to the high 
incidence of WCS languages with a composite green-blue ‘grue’ term. Nevertheless, that fewer 
than 5% of other 5 pair combinations were better organized around hues which are commonly 
central to lexical color categories, does indicate a striking similarity between pre-linguistic and 
lexical categorization.    
Underlying mechanisms. We found no evidence that infants’ novelty preference is driven by 
how perceptually similar hues are. However, when infants’ novelty response was plotted in a 
color space defined by the cardinal color sub-systems that correspond to the retinogeniculate 
pathways underlying color vision, we see for the first time that four of the categorical 
distinctions that infants make are separated by axes in this color space that pass through the 
chromaticity of the background, which could be considered the ‘adaptation point’. We propose 
therefore that the null points of the two cardinal subsystems of color vision provide boundaries 
that infants may use to parse the color continuum into categories in their recognition memory. 
This of course cannot account for infants’ categorical distinction between red and yellow – 
which must derive from alternative mechanisms. 
Our proposal that the cardinal color mechanisms provide fault lines for infant color 
categorization is related to similar arguments made about adult color naming. For example, one 
study of adult color naming and hue settings provides evidence that the cardinal axes align with 
adults’ blue-green and yellow-green category boundaries (45). Another study suggests that 
whether or not L-M cone-contrast between the color and background is positive (reddish) or 
negative (greenish) aligns with a common categorical distinction in WCS languages between 
warm and cool colors (33). Similarly, we also find that whether or not colors are ‘redder’ or 
‘greener’ than the background (values higher and lower than the background on the L/(L+M) 
axis) provides a fault line for infants’ green-yellow and blue-purple categorical distinctions, 
but we also find that S/(L+M) provides a fault line for infants’ red-purple and blue-green 
categorical distinctions. A link between low-level mechanisms of color vision and 
categorization is also implied by a computational simulation which shows that universal color 
categorization can be accounted for by human’s just noticeable difference function (15, see 
also 46). It has been suggested that categorical clustering of neurons at V1 can account for the 
warm/cool categorization in languages (33). However, an association between the cardinal 
mechanisms and categorization does not necessarily indicate that neurons code categorically 
at early stages of the visual system. The cardinal mechanisms may simply provide perceptual 
inequalities which provide a basis for post-perceptual categorization in temporal and frontal 
regions of the brain (16, 18, 47, 48). 
Although we point to an association between the cardinal mechanisms of color vision and 
infant color categorization here, it is clear that in addition to such biological forces, culture, 
environment and communication are likely also to determine both how many color terms there 
are in a lexicon and the categorical distinctions that are needed. It seems likely that languages 
would override categorical distinctions that are important in infant color memory if they are 
not relevant for a given culture or environment (2). One important question for further research 
is how we transition from a pre-linguistic color categorization based largely on biological 
mechanisms to a lexical color categorization that may make additional or fewer distinctions. 
The lack of one-to-one mapping between pre-linguistic and lexical color categorization may 
well partly explain the difficulty that children have in learning the words for colors (49–52). 
Further research should also examine whether the distinctions in infant color memory are 
‘universal’ across different cultures and environments. Given the link to the cardinal 
mechanisms of color vision we expect them to be largely consistent across cultures, but cultural 
variation in pre-linguistic categorization is at least theoretically possible.          
To conclude, we find that infant recognition memory parses the hue circle into blue, green, 
purple, yellow and red categories, and we find similarity in the structure of pre-linguistic and 
lexical color categorization. The retinogeniculate mechanisms of color vision appear to provide 
fault lines for infants’ categorical distinctions between hues. Our findings provide further 
evidence that color categorization has biological origins.  Our results also relate to broader 
debate on the biological origins of aspects of cognition such as knowledge about the physical 
world, mathematical ability and spatial cognition (2). Although certain cognitive processes may 
seem to a large extent to be culturally or linguistically constructed due to apparent linguistic 
and cultural diversity, by looking at commonalities across cultures and languages, and by 
investigating these cognitive processes in infancy, biological origins of cognitive processes can 
also be revealed. 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 295 4-6 month old infants took part in the study, with 116 infants 
excluded from the final sample for the following reasons: infant fussiness or lack of looking 
(N=78); family history of color vision deficiency (N=3); failure to familiarize during the 
familiarization phase, as defined by a non-negative slope of looking times across 
familiarization trials (N=17), failure to look during the test phase (N=12), equipment or 
experimenter error (N=3), prematurity (N=3).  The final sample of 179 infants (89 males) had 
a mean age of 21.3 weeks (SD 2.42). All infants had a birth weight greater than 2500g and no 
known visual or neurological conditions. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the 
Sciences and Technology cross schools ethical committee at University of Sussex, and the 
European Research Council Executive Agency ethics committee.  Written informed consent 
was obtained from the parents of the participants 
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented to infants in two square 12 x 12 cm windows of a wooden 
booth painted with gray Munsell N5 paint (Y=19.77 cd/m2, x=0.312, y=0.325). The two 
stimulus windows were 3.5 cm to the left and right from central fixation, and the infant was sat 
in a car seat at eye-level to the horizontal center of the windows at a distance of 50 cm. A 4 by 
5 cm digital display was embedded into another window at the central fixation point in order 
to centrally fixate infants in between trials, and a circular hole above this (diameter = 2cm) had 
a webcam positioned behind it focused on the infants’ face. A pulley system around the back 
of the booth allowed the left and right stimulus windows to either display stimuli during trials, 
or two squares of Munsell N5 gray and the central digital display during inter-trial intervals. 
The webcam fed into a computer (Dell Precision 390), which recorded the infants’ faces in 
QuickTime. A Matlab program indicated the onset and offset of trials and allowed coding of 
infant looking. Stimuli were viewed under a D65 illuminant (X-Rite: Judge II (6500K) 24”), 
with a D65 bulb embedded in a hood at the top of the booth and two D65 spot lights angled 
directly onto the two stimulus windows from behind the infant in order to ensure the 
appropriate amount of light was reflected from the stimuli. There was no other light source in 
the room and the room had black walls and no windows.  
Stimuli were sampled from the WCS stimulus array: an array of 320 colors from the Munsell 
system that vary in Munsell value (lightness) and hue and are at maximum chroma (similar to 
saturation or colorfulness) for each given stimulus. Stimuli were sampled from row G of the 
array (Munsell value = 4, Y= 12 cd/m2) in steps of 3 Munsell hue, giving 14 hues in total (5R, 
7.5 R, 5 YR, 2.5 Y, 10 Y, 7.5 GY, 5 G, 2.5 BG, 10 BG, 7.5 B, 5 PB, 2.5 P, 10 P, 7.5 RP). 
Stimuli were presented as squares (12 cm for infants) of reflective Munsell card.   
Design and Procedure. Infants were tested with a novelty preference procedure, where there 
was a familiarization phase with one hue repeatedly shown, and then a test phase where the 
familiar hue was paired with a novel hue across four trials. The time spent looking at the novel 
hue relative to the test hue during the test phase was calculated (novelty preference). Each 
infant saw one hue pair, and there was a minimum of 10 infants per pair (infants randomly 
allocated), with the hue that was familiar or novel counterbalanced for each pair. Hue pairs 
were defined first by pairing adjacent stimuli separated by 2 Munsell hue units. Where there 
was no novelty preference for two or more adjacent hue pairs then the larger hue difference 
spanning the adjacent pairs formed another hue pair to be tested. During the familiarization 
phase the same hue was presented in left and right windows for 8 8-second trials, and in the 
test phase one familiar and one novel hue were presented for 4 5-second trials with the left/right 
location of the novel hue counterbalanced and randomized. Inter-trial intervals were a 
minimum of 1 second and the trial then commenced once infants were centrally fixated, with 
a minimum 2-second interval between the familiarization phase and the test phase. An 
experimenter sat behind the infant testing booth worked the pulley system to reveal the stimuli 
during each trial and to reveal, during the intertrial intervals, the digital display which played 
a black and white looming and contracting bulls-eye central attention getter. A second 
experimenter viewing the webcam output coded infant looking online, while blind to the 
condition (colors tested) and location of the novel color. A subset (21%) of the data was coded 
twice, by an independent experimenter blind to condition and stimulus location, giving an inter-
rater reliability of Pearsons r=0.91.  
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Supplementary information 
Discrimination and novelty preference 
The definition of categorization is that ‘discriminable stimuli are treated equivalently’ (p. 52, 
Quinn, 2003).  One possibility is that a lack of a novelty preference could indicate that infants 
cannot actually see the difference between colors rather than indicate that infants can 
discriminate the colors but treat them equivalent in memory. We predicted, on the basis of a 
study of infant chromatic thresholds (34), that all chromatic differences should be discriminable 
for infants since all chromatic differences were larger than the average chromatic 
discrimination threshold at 4-months (threshold estimated to be 21∆E units in CIELAB color 
space (34): the smallest difference in the current study was 28∆E and the average was 62.38 
∆E for the smaller pairs and 109.47 for the larger pairs. However, there are difficulties in 
inferring discriminability from other studies which used different stimuli (e.g., Knoblauch’s 
estimates were for chromatic differences from neutral along protan, deutan and tritan axes, and 
the threshold estimates also had a good deal of variability).  In addition, even if all chromatic 
differences were above chromatic thresholds, it is possible that those stimuli with novelty 
preferences are more perceptually dissimilar.  Therefore, in order to further understand the 
relationship between discrimination, perceptual similarity and novelty preference we take two 
approaches.  First, we investigated the relationship between infants’ novelty preferences and 
the similarity of colors by testing whether the size of color differences in a perceptual color 
space and adult similarity ratings of the colors predicted infants’ novelty preferences.  Second, 
we made additional measurements which directly tested infant discrimination of four of the 
color pairs (two with novelty preferences and two without) to check that colors which failed to 
elicit a novelty preference could be discriminated in other contexts, and to assess the 
relationship between discriminability and novelty preference.   
Measurements of discrimination and perceptual similarity for stimulus pairs 
We tested discrimination and perceptual similarity using a target detection task developed by 
Franklin, Pilling and Davies (25). In our target detection task a colored target is seen on a 
colored background and eye-movements are recorded with an eye-tracker to measure how well 
infants can discriminate the target from the background. Low-pass luminance noise was added 
so that the target could only be detected on the basis of the chromatic difference of target and 
background and not on the basis of luminance (colors were isoluminant for the average adult 
observer which is a good estimate of infant isoluminance (54)). The task was also made to be 
gaze-contingent such that a visual and auditory reward was played when the target was fixated 
and the next trial commenced automatically following target fixation (as in 55). Four stimulus 
pairs were tested from green-yellow and purple-red regions. For both regions, two adjacent 
pairs were sampled, one pair with a novelty preference and one without. We check whether 
these pairs, which include two of the smallest chromatic differences (in CIELAB), can be 
discriminated in the context of the target detection task, and compare the perceptual similarity 
of the color pairs.  
Of course, if infants can discriminate the colors in the context of the target detection task it 
does not necessarily indicate that they can be discriminated when seen in the context of the 
novelty preference task as the spatial characteristics of the task differ.  As the stimulus pairs in 
the target detection are abutting as figure and ground, this could lower discrimination 
thresholds on the task relative to the test phase of the novelty preference task where the two 
different stimuli were surrounded by a neutral ground. Unfortunately, in infants it is not 
possible to measure discrimination of two stimuli using looking measures when the stimuli are 
shown side by side on a neutral ground as in the novelty preference task but without a 
familiarization phase. Infants may look longer at one stimulus than the other which would 
indicate discrimination, but may not have a looking preference and still be able to discriminate 
them (e.g., be able to discriminate blue and red but look at them equally). However, the target 
detection task does provide a measure of relative perceptual similarity across the color pairs. If 
novelty preferences are based on how different colors look rather than their categorical 
relationship, then the pairs for which there were novelty preferences should have greater target 
fixation than the pairs with no novelty preference.         
Methods 
Participants.  Twelve 4-6 month old infants took part, with 2 infants excluded due to 
infant fussiness.   The final sample (8 males) had a mean age of 22.63 weeks (SD 2.65). All 
infants had a birth weight greater than 2500g and no known visual or neurological conditions.  
Apparatus and Stimuli.  There were four stimulus pairs, sampled from the main 
experiment from green-yellow (2.5Y-10Y; 10Y-7.5GY) and blue-purple regions (2.5 P-10P; 
10P-7.5RP). The luminance and chromaticity co-ordinates (CIE x,y,Y, 1931) of the Munsell 
stimuli and the grey background for the novelty preference task were measured with a 
photospectrometer (spectrascan PR6500) in the viewing booth and under the same lighting 
conditions as the novelty preference task.  These x,y,Y were then rendered on a calibrated 22-
in. Mitsubishi DiamondPlus 2070SB Diamondtron CRT monitor with a resolution of 1600 x 3 
x 1200 pixels, 24-bit color resolution, and a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Stimuli were displayed via 
a PC driven Cambridge Research Systems ViSaGe MKII Stimulus Generator. Stimuli were 
shown as a colored circular target (which subtended a visual angle of 6.9°), on a colored 
background which filled the entire screen, with low pass luminance noise (12 cd/m2). The 
experiment took place in a blacked-out booth with the monitor being the only source of light.  
Eye-movements were recorded with an Eyelink 1000 eye-tracker (SR-Research), placed 
immediately in front and below the monitor, and the central point of the monitor screen was at 
the participants’ eye-level at a distance of 35 cm.  Participants were sat in a car seat that was 
fixed to a stable chair.  
 Design and Procedure. Infants were shown a cartoon whilst the eye-tracker was 
focused on their eye, and this was followed by a four-point calibration. On each trial, the 
colored target was displayed simultaneously with the colored background up until target 
fixation but not longer than 2250 ms. Fixation was defined as 160ms of continuous looking at 
one point, as in (55). If the target was fixated, the program automatically displayed a smiley 
schematic face in the same location as the target (of the same size, with eyes and mouth defined 
in gray) and a simple melody was played for 500ms. Following this, or after 2250 ms if there 
was no target fixation, the next target and background were presented, with the target location 
constrained with the target positioned at a random location 6.9° of visual angle from the infants’ 
initial point of fixation (55). If infant gaze strayed from the screen, the trial was discounted, a 
looming and contracting black and white attention getter was displayed centrally and the next 
trial was onset once the attention getter was fixated. In addition to the four stimulus pairs from 
the novelty preference task, and a condition where the target and background were the same 
color (7.5 B) in order to estimate chance performance on the task.  The allocation of each color 
in a stimulus pair as target or background was counterbalanced, and trial order was randomized. 
Trials continued until infant looking at the screen waned or until a maximum of 120 trials had 
been completed.   
 
Results and Discussion 
The percentage of trials where the target was fixated was calculated for the four green-yellow 
and purple-red stimulus pairs (hit rate), and the condition where target and background were 
identical (guess rate). SI figure 4 gives the guess rate and the hit rates for the four pairs (left 
side of the figure) with the novelty preferences for the same pairs from the main experiment 
for comparison (right side of the figure).   
 
 
  
SI Figure 1.  The average percentage of targets fixated (left side of figure) for the four pairs 
tested in the target detection task, with novelty preferences from the main experiment for 
comparison (right side of figure).  The dashed line in each panel indicates chance performance 
(also indicated by the guess rate in the target fixation panel). Asterix indicate pairs for which 
the evidence was in favor of H1 when compared to chance.   
 
Bayesian paired samples t-tests (with a Cauchy prior of 0.707) revealed that for all four pairs 
the target was fixated at a rate greater than chance, meaning that all four color pairs were 
discriminable: 7.5GY-10Y, t(9)=3.13, p=.01, B=5.32; 10Y-2.5Y, t(9)=2.77, p=.02, B=3.31; 
2.5P-10P, t(9)=8.04, p<.001, B=1081.83; 10P-7.5RP, t(9)=6.11, p<.001, B=175.26. Moreover, 
fixation was not more likely for the two pairs which elicited novelty preferences (7.5GY-10Y 
& 10P-7.5RP, mean=42.18, SD=18.41) than the two pairs which did not (10Y-2.5Y & 2.5P-
10P, mean=41.98, SD=5.85), t(9)=.09, p=.93, B=.31.  These findings clearly show that color 
differences which failed to elicit a novelty preference are discriminable by infants in other 
contexts. Even if the context of the target detection task enhances discriminability, novelty 
preferences are unlikely to be simply related to perceptual similarity since targets for color 
pairs with greater novelty preference were not always fixated at a greater rate than color pairs 
with no novelty preference.   
 
In sum, we show here that infants’ novelty preferences are unlikely to be due to discriminability 
or perceptual similarity as: i) all color differences were above estimated average chromatic 
thresholds; ii) novelty preferences do not relate to chromatic differences in perceptual color 
space, and iii) chromatic differences which failed to elicit a novelty preference are 
discriminable in other contexts and not always detected more readily than chromatic 
differences with a novelty preference.  We therefore suggest that infants’ pattern of novelty 
preference indicates that infant color memory is governed by the categorical relationship of the 
colors. 
 
The current study demonstrates that color categories affect infant hue memory.  Another 
question is whether color categories themselves affect perception (categorical perception, (25). 
That question is different to the one addressed in the target detection experiment outlined 
above.  The experiment above seeks to obtain a measure of perceptual similarity to see whether 
perceptual similarity rather than categories can account for infants’ novelty preferences. An 
experiment that tested categorical perception would need to instead equate same- and different-
category chromatic differences in discrimination and see whether categories affect perceptual 
similarity. Franklin et al. found that colored target detection was faster when on different- than 
same-category colored backgrounds, when the chromatic differences were equated in CIE 
perceptual color space (25). However, as discussed above, it is an assumption that adult and 
infant perceptual color spaces are similar, and equating stimuli in discrimination rather than 
perceptual similarity would be more logical for testing categorical perception. One approach 
which may clarify whether color categories affect infant perceptual similarity would be to 
equate same- and different-category color differences in the number of just-noticeable 
differences and then test whether the categorical status affects target detection when chromatic 
differences are suprathreshold. This approach was adopted by (47) to investigate the time 
course of color category effects in adults, and when colors were equated in just noticeable 
differences (JNDs), color categories affected post-perceptual processing around 200 ms from 
stimulus onset. Now that the current investigation has identified infants’ categorical 
distinctions, the approach taken by He et al. can be applied to infants. 
 
A-priori preference 
Infants have a-priori preferences for looking longer at some hues (e.g., reds and blues) than 
others (e.g., yellow-greens) (e.g., 56–59). The current study controlled for such a-priori 
preferences by counterbalancing across infants which stimulus was novel for each pair of 
stimuli. Due to this counterbalancing, preference for a certain hue (e.g., blue) is unlikely to 
account for novelty preference for a stimulus pair (e.g., blue and green) as half of the infants 
saw a given hue as the novel color and half as the familiar hue – when novelty preference is 
averaged across infants the effect of any a-priori preferences should cancel out (60). Mean 
novelty preferences were in fact highly similar irrespective of which stimulus in each pair was 
novel and which was familiar: the discrepancy in novelty preference was on average only 5%.  
In addition, a-priori preferences are unlikely to account for novelty preferences as a-priori hue 
preference in infants varies smoothly with hue and therefore two similar hues are unlikely to 
elicit a large difference in looking times (59).  An analysis was conducted to confirm that a-
priori preferences could not account for variation in novelty preference across stimulus pairs. 
The average looking time at each hue during the familiarization phase was used as an index of 
a-priori preference.  Looking time during the familiarization phase is a valid index of a-priori 
preference as prior research has established that infants’ a-priori preferences for hues are 
comparable whether hues are presented singly (as in the familiarization phase) or as pairs (as 
in the test phase) (61).  The average familiarization looking time at a stimulus (during either 
the first trial or across all familiarization trials) did not predict infants’ novelty preference for 
that stimulus, largest R2 = .004, smallest p=.38, largest B=.14. Likewise, the difference in 
average familiarization looking time for the two stimuli in each pair did not predict the variation 
in novelty preference across pairs, R2 = .009, smallest p=.19, largest B=.22.          
Familiarization and novelty preference 
SI Figure 2 provides the average looking time at hue during the 8 familiarization trials and the 
novelty preference scores for pairs of adjacently sampled hues (adjacent pairs) and larger hue 
pairs which straddle pairs where no novelty preference was found (large pairs). A repeated 
measures ANOVA with hue (14 levels) and trial (8 levels) as factors revealed a linear trend for 
trial, F(7,1148)= 53.965, p=<.001, B=3.29E+74, on infant looking time during the 
familiarization phase. There was no interaction of trial and hue, F(14,164) 1.28, p=.225, 
B=.002). 
 SI Figure 2. (A) Infant looking time during the familiarization trials averaged across hues (+/-
1se). (B) Novelty preference percentages (+/-1se) for pairs of adjacently sampled hues (pairs 
on left of vertical dashed line in figure) and larger hue pairs which straddle smaller pairs (pairs 
on right of vertical dashed line in figure). Asterix indicate novelty preferences which produce 
a Bayes factor in Support of H1 relative to H0 (B>3), with equal looking at novel and familiar 
hues indicated by the dashed line at 50%. Munsell codes of hues of each pair are given. 
Analysis of WCS centroids 
To investigate the hypothesis that infant color categories are organized around hues that are 
commonly central to lexical categories, we conducted an analysis using the WCS naming 
centroids (the number of times that the hue is at the center of a WCS lexical category when 
plotted in a perceptual color space (CIELAB)). If infant color categories do capture the 
common centers of lexical categories revealed by the WCS, then the hue pairs which are 
categorically different for infants (indicated by pairs with novelty preference) should span hues 
which are infrequently at the centers of lexical categories (i.e. coincide infrequently with 
category centroids when counted across WCS languages). We investigated whether the 
combination of 5 pairs for which we find novelty preference optimally avoids category 
centroids (centroid frequencies were taken from ref 8). We consider the 13 adjacent stimuli 
pairs from row G, hue columns: (3,6), (6,9), (9,12), (12,15), (15,18), (18,21), (21,24), (24,27), 
(27,30), (30,33), (33,36), (36,39), (39,2). The 5 pairs corresponding to infant novelty 
preferences are: (3,6), (12,15), (21,24), (30,33), (36-39). 
 
A simple means to quantitatively assess how well the infant preferences align with the WCS 
naming centroids is to assign a score to this particular configuration: the total number of 
centroids between the 5 stimuli pairs (excluding the stimuli column centroid counts). In this 
case, the score would be the sum of the centroid frequencies for hue columns (4,5), (13,14), 
(22,23), (31,32), (37,38). We can then examine how well this particular configuration of 5 hue 
pairs (corresponding to the infant novelty preferences) ranks against any of the 1287 possible 
combinations of 5 hue pairs, by computing the score of each of these configurations. To do so, 
we first computed the naming centroids over all 110 languages in the WCS, following Kay and 
Regier (2003). We then explicitly computed the score for all 1287 possible combinations of 5 
hue pairs, using the centroid counts along the stimulus row that we sampled from (row G). We 
found that only 4.27% of the 5 pair combinations (55/1287) resulted in a lower total centroid 
count than the 5 pairs which infants had novelty preferences for (i.e., more optimally captured 
hues that are not central to lexical categories).  
 
Additionally, we used the peak centroid counts for each hue at any lightness level so that the 
centroid peaks seen in SI figure 3 are captured in the analysis. We found that only 3.26% 
(42/1287) of the combinations resulted in a lower total centroid count than the 5 pairs which 
infants had novelty preferences for. For this peak centroid analysis, the best 5 pair combination 
that had the lowest centroid count included 4 of the 5 pairs for which infants showed a novelty 
preference, and only the blue-green pair differed (the best combination included the pair 
adjacent to and bluer than the blue-green pair for which infants showed a novelty preference).  
 
SI Figure 3. The full WCS stimulus grid and centroid analysis. A. WCS stimulus grid for 40 
hues at 8 lightness levels. Stimuli in the current experiment were sampled from row G. B. 
Centroid analysis from (8). The black and grey contour lines indicate the number of speaker 
centroids falling at that point in the stimulus grid from WCS data, with the outermost contour 
representing 100 centroids and each subsequent inner contour representing an increment in 100 
centroids. Infant novelty preferences are indicated by the gaps in the thick black horizontal line 
at row G.  
 
 
Stimulus positions in a perceptually uniform color space 
A series of regressions found that differences in CIE hue, CIE chroma and Euclidean difference 
in CIELAB perceptual color space (see SI figure 4) as predictors of novelty preference did not 
predict novelty preference (largest R2=.072, smallest p=.31, B=3.28E-10). In addition, a sample 
of 40 adults (5 males, mean age = 21.17 years (SD=1.37) rated the similarity of hue pairs twice 
using a line rating scale, and adult similarity ratings did not predict infants’ novelty preference 
(R2=.083, p=.28, B=1.13-09). 
 
 
SI Figure 4. Stimuli plotted in CIELAB perceptual color space. Stimulus pairs for which there 
was no novelty preference are indicated with black lines joining the stimuli, and pairs where 
there was a novelty preference are indicated by the absence of these lines. The cross between 
7.5R and 5R indicates a pair that was not tested. Euclidean distances in this space do not predict 
infants’ novelty preference.  
This analysis indicates that the color pairs which infants do not distinguish in recognition 
memory are not the smaller chromatic differences in adult perceptual color space which adults 
find more dissimilar than other pairs. However, one possibility is that infant perceptual color 
space at 4-6 months is different to that of adults (even in adults CIELAB is not perfectly 
uniform for large chromatic differences (53). A difference in infant and adult perceptual color 
space would need to be radical to be able to account for the pattern of novelty preferences in 
our data since there was even no novelty preference for pairs with very large CIELAB 
differences. However, a radical difference between infants and adults is perhaps unexpected 
since infants are known to be trichromatic by at least 3-months (e.g., 34) mean adult 
isoluminance is a good approximation of infant isoluminance (54) and based on chromatic 
thresholds on protan, deutan and tritan axes their perceptual color space could be predicted to 
be similar to that of adults albeit with poorer sensitivity (34).  
 
